In this post, we take a look at an anti-forensics technique that malware can leverage to hide injected DLLs. We dive into specific details of the Windows Process Environment Block (PEB) and how to abuse it to hide a malicious loaded DLL.
Cloudflare Workers provide a powerful serverless solution to run code that sits between every HTTP request and response. In this post, we’ll see how an attacker compromising a Cloudflare account can abuse Workers to establish persistence and exfiltrate sensitive data.
Today, I’m thrilled to release a new open-source project I’ve been working on in the past few weeks: Stratus Red Team, an adversary emulation and purple teaming tool, focused on emulating common attack techniques in cloud environments.
I’m a huge fan of disposable security labs, both for offensive and defensive purposes (see: Automating the provisioning of Active Directory labs in Azure). After writing Cloud Security Breaches and Vulnerabilities: 2021 in Review, I wanted to build a “purposely vulnerable AWS lab” with a typical attack path including static, long-lived credentials and with a supply-chain security element.
As 2021 fades away, we look back on cloud data breaches and vulnerabilities that were publicly disclosed this year. Last updated: March 14th, 2022.
When using AWS in an enterprise environment, best practices dictate to use a single sign-on service for identity and access management. AWS SSO is a popular solution, integrating with third-party providers such as Okta and allowing to centrally manage roles and permissions in multiple AWS accounts. In this post, we demonstrate that AWS SSO is vulnerable by design to device code authentication phishing – just like any identity provider implementing OpenID Connect device code authentication. This technique was first demonstrated by Dr. Nestori Syynimaa for Azure AD. The feature provides a powerful phishing vector for attackers, rendering ineffective controls suchContinue reading… Phishing for AWS credentials via AWS SSO device code authentication
In this short blog post, we describe how to retrieve AWS security credentials (AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID, AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY and AWS_SESSION_TOKEN) when authenticated in the AWS Console.
In cloud environments, companies usually describe their infrastructure as code using tools like Terraform or CloudFormation. In this post, we review the landscape of tools that allow us to perform static analysis of Terraform code in order to identify cloud security issues and misconfigurations even before they pose an actual security risk.
In this post, we discuss the risks of the AWS Instance Metadata service in AWS Elastic Kubernetes Service (EKS) clusters. In particular, we demonstrate that compromising a pod in the cluster can have disastrous consequences on resources in the AWS account if access to the Instance Metadata service is not explicitly blocked. Introduction For the purposes of this post, we’ll use an EKS cluster running Kubernetes v1.17.9 and created with eksctl. We could also have created the cluster using Terraform or CloudFormation. Once we created the cluster, we can use the AWS CLI to update our kubectl configuration file forContinue reading… Privilege Escalation in AWS Elastic Kubernetes Service (EKS) by compromising the instance role of worker nodes
Today, I’m releasing Adaz, a project aimed at automating the provisioning of hunting-oriented Active Directory labs in Azure. This post is the making of, where we walk through how to leverage Terraform and Ansible to spin up full-blown Active Directory environments with Windows Server 2019 and Windows 10 machines.